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ABSTRACT
The analysis in this paper was motivated by the apparent puzzle that,
despite substantial uncertainty about future inflation rates, private pensions
are almost universally unindexed. Moreover, although a variable annuity
invested in short—term money market instruments provides a good inflation hedge,
almost all private pensions provide a fixed annuity.
The results of the analysis indicate that the existence of unindexed
pensions and fixed annuities is not at all surprising. Even without Social
Security, it may be optimal to have a completely unindexed private pension and
i•t; is generally not optimal to have a completely indexed pension.
The availability of an optimal (or greater than optimal) amount of
Social Security generally reduces the desired degree of indexing and, under a
variety of conditions, makes it optimal to have no indexing at all in the
private pension.
Because unexpected changes in the price level do not alter the value
of Social Security pensions, the existence of inflation uncertainty makes a
Social Security pension optimal when it would not otherwise be and an increase
in inflation uncertainty is likely to increase the optimal reliance on Social
Security. But despite these conclusions, the analysis shows that including some
Social Security in an overall pension program is necessarily optimal only when
both money market instruments and Social Security have rates of return that are
known with certainty. When the real yield on money market instruments is uncer-
tain, the optimal pension arrangement may be a partially indexed private pension
even though Social Security is risk—free and has a return that is higher than
the expected rate on the money market instrunents. Similarly, when Social
Security is risky, the optimal arrangement may be to exclude Social Security and
to use a partially indexed private pension. In all cases, an individual who has
a low enough degree of risk aversion will prefer no Social Security and a
completely unindexed private pension.
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Martin Feldstein*
In recent years, the rapid andunexpectedincreases in the price level
have significantly eroded the value of retirees' private pension benefits. An
employee who retired in 1970 with a pension equal to 50 percent of theaverage
manufacturing wage received a monthly check for $289. The 113 percent increase
in the level of consumer prices in the subsequent decade reduced the real value
of that pension benefit by 53 percent to only 24 percent of theaverage 1970
manufacturing wage. Although some firms have voluntarily increased retirees'
benefits, these adjustments have almost always been far less than the rise in
the price level.
Since retirees obviously care about their real incomes, it is a puzzle
that, after more than a decade of rapid inflation, private pensions are still
fixed in nominal terms. Why have employers and employees until now notnego-
tiated pension benefits that are indexed or partly indexed to the price level?
Alternatively, why have employee pensions not taken the form of variable
annuities based on floating rate instruments whose nominal yield varies in the
short—run with the rate of inflation (Bodie, 1980a,b)?- Does current
behavior represent a mistake by employees and unions that makes it appropriate
*Professorof Economics, Harvard University, and President, National Bureau of
Economic Research. This paper is part of the NBER Study of Public and Private
Pensions. I am grateful to participants in the study for comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
Thekeyissue is the employee's risk of uncertain inflation. Itwouldnot
reallybe indexing if, instead of a constant nominal annual benefit, the benefit
rises at a rate that is fixed at the time ofretirement.Although the increase
inbenefits might be related to the expected rate of inflation, the employee
would continue to bear the entire risk of unexpected changes in inflation. I
shall reserve the term "indexing" for mechanisms that reduce the uncertainty of
real benefits by linking benefits either to the price level or to the yield on
short—term money market instruments.
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insome sense to modify the laws governing pensions to require such indexing?
Thepresent paper shows that the existing arrangement with purely
nominal private pensions may in fact be optimal in the presence of the indexed
system of Social Security retirement pensions. Of course,since an individual
whorelies on a nominal pension is in effect making a risky investment, there
will be unexpected losses and gains. The recent losses by retirees should be
seen as just such an unfortunate ex post outcome and not as an indication that
private pensions are either incompatible with inflation or should be indexed.
Because protection against inflation risk can only be obtained at the cost of
accepting a lower expected rate ofreturn,1 the potential retiree will generally
chooseto be less than fully protected against inflation, i.e., will choose a
partially indexed pension. Moreover, Social Securityretirement benefits pro-
videa fully indexed pension that replaces a substantial fraction of previous
peak earnings for most current retirees.2 Thecombination of Social Security
anda private pension thus provides atotal pension arrangement that is substan-
tially indexedeven if the private pension is fixed in nominal terms. For most
1 Pesando (1981) discusses a very different sense in which it is expensive to
maintain the real value of pension benefits: keeping the same initial pension
benefit and then raising benefits in proportion to the price level clearly
increases the expected value of benefits in all subsequent years. My emphasis
is on reducing the variance around any expected real stream of benefits. A
lower real variance requires investing in assets with a lower expected return
and thus increases the cost (i.e., the initial value of assets) required to pro-
vide anyexpected stream of real benefits.
2An employee who hashadmedian earnings for all of his working life now
retiresat age 65witha Social Security pension that replaces more than 1.o per-
cent of his peak pretax earnings. If he is married and his wife does not claim
benefits on the basis of her own income, his benefit will be increased to more
than 60 percent of his peak pretax earnings. Since these benefits are not sub-
jectto income or payroll tax, they replace more than 15percentof after tax
earnings.Since Social Security is indexed by the Consumer Price Index, it is
probably overindexed with respect to a true variable—weight measureof retirees'
cost of living.—3—
employees,the extent of indexing in the combined pension may be such that no
indexing of the private pension would be desired.'
The analysis in this paper makes these ideas more precise andproves
specific conclusions. Although the modelsemployedare clearly a simplification
ofreality, I believe thatthey capture the essential features of the problem.
Thefirst section of the paper analyzes an economy without Social Security in
which all retirement consumption is financed by a private pension. In section
2, Social Security isintroduced and the analysis examines the optimal mix of
Social Security and private pensions as well as the optimal indexing of private
pensions. The third section extends this analysis to a Social Security program
with uncertain benefits.2 There is then a brief concluding section.
1. Optimal Pension Indexing withoutSocial Security
Thesimplest framework within whichtoanalyze the problem ofpension
indexing is a two—period two—asset model. Employees work in the first period
and contribute an amount C to a retirement pension. In the second period of
their life, employees are retired and then receive a pension with real (but
generallyuncertain) value P.
For employees with very high earnings, Social Security benefits are low rela-
tive to private pension benefits and the degree of overall indexing of the corn—
binedpension is therefore correspondingly low. Although such employees may
preferto have some indexing of their pension benefits, the legal rules for tax
deductible ("qualified") pensions presumably prevents "discriminating" among
different classes of employees. Moreover, high income employees tend to have
additionalportfolio assets andliabilities withwhich to achieve the overall
desired degree of indexing (although generally with less favorable tax
treatment). For some lower wage employees the opposite is true; the combined
pensionprovides too niich indexing. I return to these below.
2 Allofthe analysis ignores other forms of individual wealth. The vast
majority of retirees depend almost completely on the combination of social
security and other pension income. Additional assets generally consist of only
an owner—occupied home and a small amount of liquid precautionary balances._14 —
Ina "defined contribution" type of pension plan, employee: inve:t
their pension contributions in a portfolio of bonds and corporate stock. '1hen
they retire, they receive an annuity based on the value of these assets. Since
the value of bonds and their interest payments are fixed in nominal terms, the
real rate of return of the bond portion varies inversely with changes in both
the price level and the rate of inflation. Although the real value of corporate
stock should be unaffected by changes in the price level, changes in the
expected rate of inflation do cause changes in real sharevalues.' Thus the
real value of a defined contribution pension invested in any combination of
bonds and stocks is uncertain.
In the more common "defined benefit" type of pension, the employer
invests the contrfbutions and promises the employee benefits that depend on the
employee's final year's earnings and that then remain fixed in nominalterms.2
In the simplest interpretation of the defined benefit plan, the retired employee
has a fixed nominal annuity that is analogous to a bond. Because the firm can
invest the pension funds in a mix of bonds that exactly matches the benefit obli-
gation, the firm provides this bond yield to the retiree. Although firms may
in fact invest pension assets in a mix of stocks and bonds, the equity owners of
the firm receive the excess return (if any) generated in this way in exchange
for accepting the extra risk of a non—hedged investment.
ore generally, however, the employee in a defined benefit plan may
receive benefits that depend on the performance of the pension fund. This is
1 See, e.g., Feldstein (l980a, 1980b), Hendershott and Ru (1979) and Summers (1981a).
2 The nature of the obligation and of the investment is actually more complicated
in practice. The employer is technically only obligated to provide for the
"vestedt' benefits that are based on existing service. But to prevent a rapid
increase in pension costs as employees approach retirement, employers often anti-
cipate future expected pension obligations. Some firms, however, do not fully
fund even their vested obligations but substitute an implicit corporate promise.
See Feldstein (1981).—5—
truenot only because a low enough value of fund assetscan reduce benefits
below the promised level but also because successfulpension performance can
leadto increases in the promised level of benefits and adhoc "voluntary"
increases in benefits to retirees.' In what follows, I donot distinguish bet-
ween defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
Although virtually all private pensions are unindexed, this isnot
necessary. Zvi Bodie (1980a,b) has recently shown that assets invested ina
sequence of three—month Treasury bills provide a very good inflation hedge.2
Thus, individuals in a defined contribution plan can achieve anessentially
risk—free real return by investingin billsandan employer whomanages a
defined benefit plan can offer an essentially indexedpension without additional
risk to shareholders by investing in such bills.
I shall denote the real return on bills as the randomvariable rb with
mean b and variance cb. If this type of investment provides a perfect index
asset, there is no correlation between rb and the inflation rate. In some of the
analysis that follows, I shall make the stronger assumption thatrb isa
constant(ub =0).Bodie's empirical analysis showed that the returnon the
See Bulow (1981), Miller and Scholes (1981) and Pesando (1981)on the benefi- cial interest of employees in the pension fund.
2 More specifically, Bodie showedthat to minimize the variance of the real return on assets, i.e., tocome as closeaspossible to a risk—free price—
indexed investment, the assetsshould be invested in Treasury bills since their
nominalyield varies directly withinflation. Although the close correlation of
the nominal yield on bills and inflation has characterized thepast two decades, the same relation did not hold in earlier years (Summers, 1981;Mishkin, 1981); inBodie's defense, however, it mayreasonably beargued that the Federal
ReservePolicy in the decade before 1953makesthis period irrelevant and that the next decade was one of such price stability that nothingcan reasonably be inferred about the relation between inflation and short—term interestrates. Bodie shows also that the historical variance may be slightly reducedby including commodity futures as well. Bodie's optinn.im assumes that short sales
by pensions are not permitted.—6—
minimum—real—variance portfolio has averaged approximately zero (i.e.,
=0).
and the annual standard deviation was approximately one percentage point (b=O.OU.
In theimportant special case of =bb
=o"bills" are a perfect real store
ofvalueand investment in bills provides an indexed pension.
Similarly,I shall denote the real yield on the completely unindexed
pension by the random variable r with meanand variance au. This yield can
be interpreted as the yield that is implicit in setting the levelof the nominal
annuity of a strict defined benefit plan, or astheexpost yield onthe mixof
debtand equity in a defined contribution plan, or as the ex post yield on a
performance—relateddefined benefit plan.
The realvalue of the employee's pension in retirement is given by
(1.11) P =U(l+r) +(C—U)(l+rb)
where C is the pension contribution, U is the amount of thecontribution that
purchases an unindexed pension (of either thedefined contribution or defined
benefittype) and C—U is the "indexed" portionrepresentedby an investment in
bills. Theemployee's problem in designing a pension is thus similarto a port-
folio allocation problem, i.e., selecting the value of U thatmaximizes the
employee's expected utility of retirement consumptionE [v(p)]subjectto the
constraint implied by equation 1.1.1 I shall assume throughout the analysis
that short—sales of either asset are not permitted; thus,C > U0.
1 In principle, the employee decides the size of the pension contribution and
the form of investment simultaneously. The present analysistakes the size of
contribution asgiven.—1—
Ifthe returns (ru and rb) are normallydistributed(or if the
individual's utility function can be approximated bya quadratic function),
the individual's preferences can be represented graphicallyby a set of indif-
ference curves in terms of the mean and standard deviation of theportfolio's
terminal value (Tobin, 1958).Figure1combinesthese indifference curves with
theopportunity locus in the important case in which investment in "bills"pro-
vides a fully indexed pension with zero mean return.
Consider first the line connecting the origin withpoint U. Theorigin
representsa pension fund invested exclusively in bills (and is thereforemarked
with the letter b). Since there is no uncertainty about the realreturn on
these assets, the standard deviation of the pension benefit iszero. The pen-
sionbenefit is therefore C,the initial contribution. Point U represents the
pension that results when thepensionis completely unindexed. Since the
standard deviation of the return per dollar contributed to the unindexedpension
isauu, the standard deviation of the pension benefit is Equation1.1
implies that,for any U, the expected pension benefit is E(P) =C—U+u(i+)
=
C+ The expected benefit associatedwith thecompletely unindexed pension
is thus C +Uj.Anypoint on the straight line between the origin and Urepre-
sents a feasible pension allocation.
The indifference curve tangent to the bU line at Erepresents pre—
ferences that lead to a partiallyindexedpension; anymovetoward more complete
indexing causes a reduction in expected pension benefits that outweighs the
reduction in risk.
Different preferences would lead to different degrees of pension


















(i.e.,more nearly parallel to the horizontal axis) and can imply no tangency
along the bU line. In this case, the optimal pension will correspond to point U
with no indexing at all.' Increases in risk aversion shifts the optimum toa
more fully indexed pension but, except for the case of "infinitely" risk averse
individuals, the optimum will not involve a fully indexed pension.2 Thus the
optimal pension will not be fully indexed and may be either partially indexed or
not indexed at all.
To make these ideas more precise, consider an individual whosepre-
ferences can be represented by a constant absolute risk aversion utility func-
tion, v(P) =— withrisk aversion paramenter a >0(Arrow, 1971). Since
the amount of the pension contribution that is unindexed is U, the value of the
pension is the random amount P =C+rU.Thus,
(1.2) E [v(P)] =E[-__-_ e]
1 —cx(C+r u)UI
cx
and, if the return r is normally distributed,
222
(1.3) E [v(p)] =- —IL- e a J uu
Maximizing E ['i()] with respect to U implies the optimal unindexed share of the
pension is
1 pensions could sell bills shortandinvest in bonds, the true optimum
would be on the extension of line bU with greater yield and greater risk.
2Intuitively, an individual who has assumed no risk will always be willing to




Foranyfinite value of the risk aversion parameter, >0andthepension is
less than completely indexed. Moreover, if the risk aversion and the variance
are low enough relative to the expected return, the entire pension fund will be
* 1 unindexed(UC).
Returningto figure 1, we can consider the effect of an increase in
inflation uncertainty on the optimal extent of pension indexing. An increase in
inflation uncertainty (on the assumption that bills permit complete indexing) is
equivalent to an increase in the variance of the unindexed pension andtherefore
a shift in locus of feasible pensions from bU to bU' •Atevery point along bU'
the tradeoff between risk and return is less favorable; a greater increase in
real risk must be accepted for each increase in expected real return. Moreover,
at the degree of indexing that was optimal with the lower level of inflation
uncertainty (i.e., at point E' on bU' that corresponds to point Eon bU), the
individual has the same expected return but more risk.It seems likely there-
fore that with more initial risk and a less favorable risk—return tradeoff,the
individual would choose to index the pension more completely. This is shown in
figure 1 where the newoptimumat E2 lies closer than E' to the complete
indexing point. In the constant absolute risk aversion case of equationl.1& it
is also clear that an increase in causes U to fall and the optimal degree
of indexing to rise.2
1 Note that a result like l.4 can be obtained with constant proportional risk
aversion in continuous time models; see Bodie (1979).
2 It is of course possible that an increase in inflation uncertainty could
reduce the degree of indexing, i.e., that the indifference curvewould be
tangent to bU' at a point between E', and U' •Thiswould imply that risk aver-
sion decreased as risk increased for given yield, surely anunlikely preference.—11—
This shift in the degree of pension indexing shows two ofthe adverse
consequences associated with an increase in inflation uncertainty. First, in
order to reduce the added risk, individuals shift theirpensions to a more
completely indexed form with lower expected yield. Second, even witha greater
degree of indexing, the individual mayhavea greater risk (as shown in figure 1).
The lower indifference curve at E2 reflects both of these adverseconsequences.
The analysis based on figure 1 andequation 1.2assumed the possibi-
lity of a perfectly indexed pension that provides a perfect store of valuebut
no real return.2- More generally, a pension based on a variableannuity invested
inmoney market instruments ("bills") would provide a random return with mean
2 2
variance %bandcovariancewith the return on an unindexed pension fund.
With rb uncertain,it followsfrom equation 1.1 that thevariance of the pension
22 22 2 value is (c—u)a bb+ uu+2U(C—u)a ubThe minimum variance does not
correspond to apension invested only in bills but to one in which the unindexed
fraction is
The real returns on an unindexed pension and on billsmay be
correlated either positively or negatively. If the correlation isnegative
1 Sincea perfect index asset does not exist, such a perfect index pension
wouldhave to be a real liability ofthe corporation and its shareholders. For
acceptingsuch risk, shareholders would have to be compensated and the return to
employees might therefore be negative. The analysis based on figure 1and
equation 1.2canbe interpretedasan approximationto either the opportunity






(e.g., because a higher real short—term interest rate is associated with a
highernominal long rate and therefore with a fall in bond prices or in the real
value of a fixed nominal annuity) 0ub <0and U is between zero and C, implying
that the minimum variance pension is only partially indexed.This caseis shown
by the bU curve in figure 2; the point marked U indicates the minimum variance
mix.
Evenif the correlation between the real yields on bills and on an
unindexed pension is positive, the minimum variance pension is only partly
indexed if °ub <ebb,i.e., if the regression coefficient of the return on the
unindexed pension on the return on bills is less than one. WtTlen this is not
true, i.e., when eubebb, the minimumvariancepension is invested in bills
only.1 If eub =%b'the investment opportunity locus looks like bU' in figure
2 with the minimumvarianceat point b. If, however, a2ub >ebb,the invest-
ment opportunity locus looks like bU" in figure 2 with an unconstrained minimum
variance point that corresponds to a short position in the unindexed pension.
2 2 As the indifference curves in figure 2 indicate, whenever a bba ub
the optimum pension will never be invested completely in the security that pro-
vides the greatest indexing. This is obvious when the minimumvariancereal
2 2 —
returnrequires only partial indexing (a ub<abb); only the portion of the bti
locus between U and U is efficient since a more completely indexed pension would
have both a lower expected return and greater variance. But even when the uncon-
structed minimumvariance pension is invested in bills only (a2Ub =ebb),the
optimum pension is at least partly unindexed because at point b a small increase in
1 If the constraint that prohibits short positions were relaxed, the minimum
variance pension mightinvolvea negative amount of the unindexed pension.
Bodie's calculation that the minimum variance portfolio contains only bills is















yieldcan be obtained with essentially no increasein risk.1 Only in the case
where the bills—only pension represents a constrainedminimumvariance
2 2
(a ub >° bbmight an indifference curve be tangent to the opportunitylocus at
b.Of course, in allthreecases individuals with low enough risk aversion will
prefer to have no indexing at all.
These ideas can again be made more precise by consideringthe special
case of a constant absolute risk aversion utilityfunction. It follows from
equations 1.1 and 1.2 that
—aP




12 22 22 2
+—a[(c—u)bb + ua uu +2U(Cu)aub'
2
MaxizingE[P)l with respect to U implies:
(i. i) U* =
— +aciabb—aub]
a [a +bb—2a
Since the value of U that miniraizesthereal variance is U =
c(a2bb— +a2bb—2a2ub'it is clear from equation 1.7 that the
1 At U =0,da/di =0.To see this, note that the variance of the pension is
2
=[(c—u)2a2bb +U2+2U(C—U)aubi and therefore da2/dU =2[—(c—u) a2bb
+ + (c—2u)ub1• When0ub =abb,da2/dU =0at U =0.
Since dii/dU = - 1.tb)>0,da/dll =0.—15—
optinal pension will always have less bills (and therefore greater variance) than
the ninirmimvarianceinvestment. Whenvariationsin the real yields on bills
and the unindexed pension are negatively correlated (a2Ub <0),the minimum
varianceU >0and therefore U >0.Moreover, for a sufficiently low degree of
risk aversion, U A and the pension is completely unindexed. Similarly, if
2 2
bb =aUb,U =0but U >0and, for low enough a, U 'C.Thus even when
the unconstrained minimum variance pension requires investing in bills only,
the optimal pension will be partly unindexed and may be completely unindexed.
2 2
Only when °bb <aubby enough to offset the yield differential (—
willthe pension be invested exclusively in bills but, in that case also, the
bills only portfolio does not achieve the minimum variance.
Theresults of this section can be summarized briefly. Evenwhena
perfectlyindexed pension can be obtained by investing pension funds in money
market instruments ("bills"), individuals will always prefer a less than completely
indexed pension. When bills are a risky asset, the minimum variance pension may
be achieved byinvestingin bills only or by a partly indexed pension, depending
on the regression coefficient between the unindexed pension yield and the bill
yield. Individuals will, however, always prefer a pension that has more real
risk than the minimum variance pension. In both cases, the individual who has a
sufficiently low degree of risk aversion will want a pension that is invested
exclusively in the higher yielding asset and that makes no attempt to reduce
therisk of inflation.
2.PensionIndexingwithRiskless Social Security
As Paul Saniuelson (1958) has shown, a pay—as—you—go Social Security
pension pays a real return on tax "contributions" equal to the real growth rate—'c—
oflabor income. This is easilyshownin the context of the present two—period
model. P.ssuinethatthere are N1 workers in the current generation (denoted by
the subscript i) and that each worker earns a real wage of w1. If the Social
Security program imposes a tax at rate t,thetotal contribution of these
workersis T1 =tw1N1.These funds are immediately paid out as benefits to the
current retirees (i.e., the previous generation of workers). The next genera-
tion of N2 workers will earn w2N2 and pay a total tax of T2 =tv2N2ifthe tax
rate remains unchanged. These tax revenues will then be paid out as Social
Security benefits to the current employees, B1 =tw2N2.
The relation between the taxes paid by the current generation of
workers (T1) and the benefits that they subsequently receive (B1) is thus:
B tw N
(2.1) ______ _____________ = (1+y)(1 +n)
T1 tw1N1
=(1+g)
where y is the growth rate of real wages per employee, n is the growth rate of
the labor force, and g is the growth rate of total labor income. Thus, even
though Social Security contributions are not invested, participants earn a real
return on their contributions in a growing econonr. In the U.S. econou during
the past 30 years, total employee compensation has grown at an average annual
rate of about 3percent.1
The important feature about the Social Security program in the present
context is that its pay—as—you—go character makes it automatically indexed. The
1 The rate of return on Social Security contributions during this period was
substantially greater because the tax rate Ct) was increased substantially (from
0.020 in 1950 to 0.133 in 1981). Social Security taxes are also levied only on
a portion of payroll income and not on the entire employee compensation.—11—
real tax revenue available topaybenefitsmayvary with productivityand with
changes in population growth andlaborforce participation, but it does not
dependon the price level. Asa result, the United States and othercountries
withpay—as—you—go Social Security pensions promise benefitsthat are fully
indexed to inflation.1 In thispaper, I shall take thepay—as—you_go(i.e.,
unfunded) character of Social Securityas given2 and ask how theexistence of
such Social Secuity benefits influence the
optimal indexing of private pensions.
Tobegin, I shall assume that there is nouncertainty about the rate of growth
of earnings (g) and therefore that SocialSecurity can provide an indexedpen-
sion with a fixed rate of return,g.I shall examine the optimal mixofSocial
Security and a private pension in this case andthen the effect of an
arbitrarily fixed amount of Social Securityon the optimal indexingof the pri-
vate pension. Thefourth section extends the analysis tothe more general
situationin which uncertainty about realgrowthof earnings implies uncertainty
aboutthe real return on Social Security.
The simplest case to consider is theone in which bills provide aper-
fect storeof value with no uncertainty and azero real return. Social Security
with expected return g and nouncertainty then clearly dominates arr investment
inbills. The individual prefers a combinationof Social Security and a com-
pletely unindexed private pension, with thepreferred combination reflecting the
Before 1972, the U.S. Social Securitysystem was not formally indexed. The law was changed occasionally to adjust thebenefits of retirees but real bene- fits did fluctuate around agenerally constant ratio of benefits to realwages. However, it wasonlyin the late 1960's that inflationbegan to appear as a
serious and persistent problem for retirees.
2 The alternativewould be to accuialate a Social Securityfund and use its earnings to paybenefits.The working generation couldguarantee the real value
of benefits to retirees, varying the taxrateto obtain the necessary funds.—18—
individual'srisk aversion, the expected returns on an unindexed pensionand on
SocialSecurity and the variance of the real yield on theunindexed pension. It
is worth emphasizing that in this important casethe optimal private pension is
completely unindexed. Private pensions may beindexed only because of depar-
tures from the assumptions of this case:uncertain returns on bills or on
Social Security or a suboptimal amount of SocialSecurity.
Thiscase is illustrated in figure 3. Point13correspondsto a pri-
vate pension invested only in bondsandno Social Security. Point b corresponds
toa fully indexed private pension invested onlyin bills and no Social
Security. Pointcorresponds to Social Security only, with no privatepension.
Itis clear that pointdominatespointandthat,while arpoint in the
triangle connecting points B,and0isfeasible, only points on the Uline
are efficient. The indifference curveis drawn so that the optimal pension
(at E1) is one—half Social Security andone—half an unindexed private pension.
Foran individual witha constant absolute risk aversionutility func-
tion,the optimal amount of the unindexed privatepension is
(2.2) =1JU1S
where is the yield on Social Security taxcontributions. The optimal amount
to be contributed to Social Securityis then C —
1i continue to assumethatthe total amount of retirement savingsis fixed and
divided between Social Security andtheprivate pension.—19—
Figure 3














Before leaving this case, it is interesting to note theeffect of
inflation uncertainty on the optimal amount of Social Security.With constant
absolute risk aversion, the effect is unambiguous. Anincrease in inflation
2 *
uncertaintyimplies a higher value of and therefore depresses U in equation
2.2. More inflation uncertainty implies greaterreliance on unfunded Social
Security and less on the funded private pension.Note that this is true even
though a completely indexed private pensioncould be achieved by investing the
pension assetsinbills. With a more general utility function the effectof an
increasein inflation uncertainty is formally ambiguous butis likely to
increase reliance on Social Security. Wheninflation uncertainty increases, the
tradeoffbetween risk and return becomes less favorable tobonds while the
amountofuncertainty at the initial level of Social Securitybecomes greater.
With greater initial levels of risk and a lowercost of reducing risk, the indi-
vidual is likely to want to reduce risk by increasingreliance on SocialSecurity.1
Untilnow, the analysis has assumedthat the amount of Social
Security is set optimally. If the size of theSocial Security pension is
instead set exogenously at a level that is lessthan optimal, individuals may
1 This substitution of a low yield unfunded Social Security pension for real
capital formation in a funded private pensionis anotherof the adverse
consequencesof increased inflation uncertainty.
Someone zho was trying to develop a positive theoryof the growth of Social
Security benefits might note that optimalbehavior required a rise in relative
benefits as inflation and inflation uncertaintyincreased and that this is
indeedwhat has happened in recent years. A workerwith median earnings who
retired at age 65 received benefits equal toabout one—third of peak earnings
until 1912. A change in the benefit formailathen caused the ratio to rise
rapidly tomore than 50 percent (in 1980)withan implied steady state value of
more than140percent. A more historically mindedstudent of Social Security
might explain the unprecedented rise bythe electoral politics of 1972 andthe
unintended effects of inappropriate indexingformmilae.—21 —
wantto ir.dex partially their private pension. In figure 3, the kinked line
connecting points b' and U'representsthe efficent frontier when the amount of
the Social Security contribution is constrained to equal one—third of C.If the
privatepension (i.e., the amount c—s) is completely indexed, the value of the
pension will be c(i+ii/3).Thisisshownas point ', onethird of the way
betweenb and S. If the private pension is completely unindexed, the expected
value of the pension is (C—S)(i+)+S(i+p5) and its standard deviation is
(C_S)c. This is shown as point U'. If the indifference curve is tangent to
the line segment b'U', the optimal private pension is partially indexed. But
since the segment b'U' is steeper than SU, the indifference curve need not be
tangent between b' and U'. In figure 3, the relevant indifference curve touches
the line at the kink point UTwhere the private portfolio is not indexed at all.
Although it mayseemsurprising that a reduction in the indexed Social Security
pensiondoes not always induce an increased indexation of the private pension,
this merely reflects the fact that the private fully indexed pension has a lower
yield than the Social Security pension.
Ifthere is no riskiess private asset, the analysis of the optimal
mixofSocial Security and the private pensionassets andof the impact of
changesin the exogenously set level ofSocial Security is more complex. In
figure4,thebU curve represents the purely private pension with different
combinations of bills andan indexed pensions. Ifthe value of a pure Social
Securitypension corresponds to point any point on any line betweenand
the &locusis feasible.However, only the points n 51Uare efficient; all
otherfeasible points have lower means for the same variance. But if the value
ofa pure Social Security pension corresponds to point S2 the line connecting















correspondto combinations of Social Security andapartly indexedpension (if
theoptimum occurs on the straight segment 52X) or to a partlyindexedpension
with no Social Security if the optimum lies on the segment XU of the private
pension curve. In either case, the private pension will not be invested only in
bills and will in fact contain less in bills than the minimum variance pension
fund. Of course, with low risk aversion the indifference curves may not be
tangent at any feasible point, implyingthatthe optimum is a completely unin—
dexed private pension.
Constraining the amount of Social Security to be less than the opti-
mal amount hasthesame general effect when bills are risky as itdoeswhen they
providea perfect index asset. The optimal pensions may involve increased
indexing or, if the individual is not very risk averse, no change in the origi-
nal degreeof indexing. In particular, even with the amount of Social Security
reduced, a completely unindexed pension may beoptimal.This is illustrated in
figure 14
Inthecase in which the value of the pure Social Security pension
wouldbe S1, the optimum pension (at E1) consists of an equal mix of Social
Security and the completelyunindexed pension invested in bonds. Now constrain
theamount of Social Security to be one—third of the total pension contribution:
SC/3. This implies that if the private pension is completely unindexed,
the total expected pension value is s(i+) +U(l+)=(l+5/3+2/3)cand
thecorresponding standard deviation is 2C/3; this combination is shown
at point U'. Similarly, if the private part of the pension is completely
indexed, the mean and standard deviation of the total pension value is shown at
point b'. The new opportunity locus is constructed in this way for all points
between b' and U'. The new optimum private pensions could involve partial—214—
indexing(i.e., correspond to some point on theb'U' locus), but since the slope
of the new locus is steeper than the slope of the S U line, the optimum may
occurat a corner solution at point U' as shown in figure 14•
3. Optimal Indexing with Uncertain Social Security
Although unexpected changes in the price level do not alter the real
value of a Social Security pension, unexpected changes in the growth of the real
wage rate or in the growth of the labor force are a source of potential uncer-
tainty in Social Security benefits that was ignoredin the previous section.'
Thepresent section assumes that Social Security provides an uncertain pension.
Becausethe general case in which both bills and bonds are also uncertain assets
is complex to analyze and not particularly informative, I focus on the case in
which bills providea perfect indexasset with zero real return and no variance.
Oneexample of this situation is shown in figure 5.Asusual, point
represents a completely indexed private pension, point Uacompletely unin—
dexed private pension, and point S no private pension but reliance only on
Social Security. The shape of the SU curve, particularly the fact that the
minimum variance point does not correspond to 5, implies that variations in the
yield on Social Security and on bonds are either independent, negatively corre-
lated or correlated in a weak positive way.2 Since this restriction seems to me
to be rather mild, I shall not deal explicitly with the alternative case; the
results are easily derived by a simple modification of figure 5.
Pointsalong the U curve represent combinations of Social Security
and a completely unindexed private pension. Points on the &linerepresent
-Isay "potential" uncertainty because the Social Security program may guaran-
tee real benefits and allow the tax rate on employees to vary. The present U.S.
legislative debate about the choice between raising taxes and reducing benefits
is testing whether the "uncertainty" is "potential" or "actual".
2 The formal condition is that the regression of the unindexed pension yield on













combinations of Social Security and a completelyindexedprivate pension.
Fianily, points on the line between b and the pointoftangency withtheUS
curve(atx)representcombinations of Social Security and a partiallyindexed
private plan.
Since the efficient frontier consists of the line bX and the segment
of the curve between X and U, several possible pension arrangements canimmi—
diatelybe excluded as never optimal for any utility function. First,it is
never optimal to rely exclusively on eitherSocial Security (point )oron a
completely indexed private pension (point b). Further,it is never optimal to
use a combination of just Social Securityand a fully indexed private pension
(points on line )sincea higher mean can be obtained with the samevariance
by using a less than fully indexed private pension.
An individual with sufficiently low risk aversion will preferto have
only a private pension andonethat is not indexed at all. For such an indivi-
dual, there will be no tangency on the b X Ulocus but the highest feasible
indifference curve will touch point U. With more risk aversion,a tangency will
occur alongtheXU curve where the individual hasacombination of Social
Securityand a completely unindexed private pension. Only with sufficiently
great risk aversion will the indifference curve tangencyoccur along the bX
line where the individual combines Social Securitywith a partially indexed pri-
vate pension.
Figure6 presentsa modified form of figure 5in which no ray from the
origin (i.e., from point b) is tangent to the curvegenerated by combinations of











Swhen tze yield on an unindexed pension is sufficiently high relative to its
risk. In this case, the efficient set is just the straight line 6I3.It is
never cptimal in this case to have any Social Security andtheoptimal private
pension is either unindexed (as shown by the highest feasible indifference
curve touching the U line at U)or,for a more risk averse individual, by a
partlyindexedprivate pension (with the indifference curve tangent on the &i
line).
4.Conclusion
The analysis in this paper wasmotivatedby the apparent puzzle that,
despite substantial uncertainty about future inflation rates, private pensions
are almost universally unindexed. Moreover, although a variable annuity
invested in short—term moneymarket instrumentsprovides a good inflation hedge,
almost allprivatepensions provide a fixed annuity.
The results of the analysis indicate that the existence of unindexed
pensions and fixed annuities is not at allsurprising.Even without Social
Security, it may be optimal to have a completely unindexed private pension and
it is generally not optimal to have a completely indexed pension.
The availability of an optimal (or greater than optimal) amount of
Social Security generally reduces the desired degree of indexing and, under a
varietyof conditions, makes it optimal to have no indexing at all in the
private pension.
Becauseunexpected changes in the price level do not alter the value
of Social Security pensions,the existence of inflation uncertainty makes a
Social Security pension optimal when itwould not otherwise be and an increase
ininflation uncertainty is likely to increase the optimal reliance on SocialSecurity. But despite these conclusions, the analysis shows that including some
Social Security in an overall pension program is necessarily optimal only when
both money market instruments and Social Security have rates of return that are
known with certainty. When the real yield on money market instruments is uncer-
tain,the optimal pension arrangement may be a partially indexed private pension
eventhough Social Securityis risk—free and hasa return that is higher than
the expected rate on the ney market instruments. Similarly, when Social
Security is risky, the optimal arrangement may be to exclude Social Security and
to use a partially indexed private pension. In all cases, an individual who has
a low enough degree ofriskaversion will prefer no Social Security and a
coniplet ely unindexed private pension.—30—
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